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Emissions of black carbon from aerospace vehicles pose a challenge to international
regulators. This mode of transport is still in its infancy, but is predicted to develop rapidly.
Despite the lack of comprehensive scientiﬁc research, it has been argued that black carbon
is the main contributor to climate change after greenhouse gases.
These emissions, which cause transboundary pollution, cannot be effectively reduced
by national laws because of differences in emissions standards. The main challenge is how
to regulate them – through binding or non-binding laws – and in which form – harmo-
nisation or uniﬁcation of laws. International air and space regulations are subject to the
trends of politicisation and economisation. The lack of a binding international law that
regulates greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation industry is primarily caused by a
lack of political will and economic calculations of certain states with respect to limits on
their national interests. This article proposes soft law as a solution to stagnation in
creating binding international regulations for emissions in the aviation and aerospace
industry.
& 2015 Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the 21st century, vehicles of a new kind are emerging – aerospace vehicles, which can be deﬁned as "ﬂight instru-
mentalities that have all the attributes of aircraft in addition to the capability to operate in outer space" (Pelton & Jakhu,
2010, p. 231). The focus of this article is on aerospace vehicles for suborbital ﬂights, during which they will emit black
carbon. The concept of suborbital ﬂight, which is not deﬁned under international law, is however deﬁned in the US
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (2004) as “the international ﬂight path of a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, or
any portion thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous impact point does not leave the surface of the Earth” (Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2010). An aerospace vehicle takes off from a spaceport exactly like an aircraft would, goes intouction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
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and comes back to the spaceport again in the fashion of an aeroplane. An ongoing problem is the distinction between the air
zone and outer space, but this dispute is less important for the purpose of emissions – particularly because on 29 May 2014,
Virgin Galactic signed an agreement with Spaceport America as that company is prepared to clear off its suborbital ﬂights
(Forbes, 2014).
These vehicles emit, among other things, black carbon, which is "a light-absorbing solid particle emitted as a result of the
incomplete combustion of carbon-based fuels (i.e., fossil fuels, biofuels, wood)" (Environment Canada, 2015). As such, it is
claimed to be the second-biggest contributor to climate change after greenhouse gases (UN Reg Inf Cent West Eur UNRIC,
2013). An IPCC report from 2014 indicates that black carbon emitted from suborbital vehicles is characterised as having
“indirect radiative forcing effects and large regional impacts” (Climate Change, 2014), and despite its short duration
(Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008, p. 221–222), may contribute to climate change (Climate Change, 2014). The main con-
sequence of emissions left unattended is their fast growth, which contributes to climate change.
Climate change is deﬁned as a long-term, irreversible process of physical and chemical changes in atmospheric structure
that causes an increase in the Earth's temperature and radical weather anomalies (NASA, 2008). According to the Global
Warming Policy Foundation, climate change is characterised by “changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties,
and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer” (IPCC Introduces New ‘Climate Change’ Deﬁnition,
2011). The most visible results are rising global temperatures, intensive rain, long droughts, ﬂoods and hurricanes (US EPA,
2015). Greenland and West Antarctica are losing their ice, which also leads to higher sea levels (National Geographic
Society, 2015).
Climate change is to large degree a result of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), as well as carbon monoxide (CO), oxides
of nitrogen (NOx), methane (CH4), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxide (N2O) and non-methane volatile organic compounds
(NMVOCs) (Treanton, 2001, p. 96). Although aviation contributes “only” up to 3% of global emissions (Reducing emissions
from aviation, 2014), this number is likely to increase by up to 15% by 2050 (Dubois & Ceron, 2006, p. 181) if no preventive
measures are implemented at an international level. In other words, the aviation industry will make an increasing con-
tribution to climate change in the future if no new laws are imposed to mitigate these emissions, especially in light of the
likely doubling of air trafﬁc from 1998 to 2020 (Anderson et al., 2006, p. 1).
The fuel of suborbital vehicles, which has similar properties to that currently used for rockets, adversely affects the ozone
layer and thus contributes to the depletion of ozone (Friedberg, 2013, p. 207). There is therefore much to worry about,
despite the statement of Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic, who said that space tourism would have only a
minor impact on climate change (Branson, 2013). Researchers from the National Center for Atmospheric Research in
Boulder, Colorado, are currently measuring emissions of black carbon from the spaceport in New Mexico (Shiga, 2010), and
the simple answer at this stage of research is that the space tourism will adversely affect climate change. Emissions of black
carbon from suborbital vehicles should therefore be included to create a complete picture of the harmonisation problem.
In spite of many international soft and hard laws, including the Stockholm Declaration (1972), the Geneva Convention
(1979), the Vienna Convention (1985) and Montreal Protocol (1987), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992) and its Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the resolutions of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), there is no
international legal framework that deals with emissions from aerospace vehicles. The lack of movement on the issue of
emissions from aviation industry was interrupted by Directive 2008/101/EC (Directive 2008/101/EC, 2008) and its entry into
force in 2012 (hereinafter the EU Directive). This constitutes the ﬁrst binding, although European, piece of legislation that
includes emissions from the aviation industry. However, the EU Directive includes international airlines in its scope, thus
causing a global disagreement and accusation by some states (including USA, China, and Russia) of the ICAO's role in
regulating international civil aviation being usurped. The ICAO had no choice but to deal with this issue at its session in
2013, and decided to start working on global market measures with a view to achieving a framework for the regulation of
emissions by 2020 (ICAO, 2013).
This article provides reasons for the failure of international air and space law in effectively regulating emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) and black carbon. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of binding laws (hard laws), which
encompass treaties, conventions and directives, and non-binding laws (soft laws), which include declarations, guidelines,
codes of conduct and best practices, as well as the appropriateness of harmonisation or uniﬁcation in selecting the most
effective regulatory path, will be discussed in the context of emissions from the aerospace industry. The objectives of this
research are to demonstrate the seriousness of rising emissions of greenhouse gases and black carbon from the aerospace
industry and their impact on climate change, and highlight the need to create a more effective legal instrument aimed at
reducing these emissions. The failure of international binding air and space law to regulate emissions is caused by inter-
national disagreements on the form of legal instrument deemed applicable to emissions, widely varying regimes for air and
space law, and the politicisation and economisation of law. Legal instruments are divided into two groups: hard law and soft
law. For legal instruments to be effective, their harmonisation or uniﬁcation is required. Two legal research methodologies
will be applied. The ﬁrst of these, doctrinal methodology (van Gestel & Micklitz, 2011; Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012), helps to
describe the most efﬁcient and realistic legal framework for regulating emissions from the aerospace industry. The second,
interdisciplinary methodology (Heberlein, 1988), is needed to understand the impact of politics and economics on the
international lawmaking process.
In Section 2, the author aims to demonstrate the seriousness of the problem of rising emissions of black carbon from the
aerospace industry, provide reasons for creating a legal instrument to help reduce emissions, and describe the use of
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will be outlined, and the harmonisation and uniﬁcation of international law will be explained. Moreover, international legal
instruments, which do not include greenhouse gases emitted by the aviation industry, will be explored in addition to certain
aspects of the EU Directive. These examples are given to prove that the establishment of a hard international law that
includes emissions from aerospace vehicles is not likely in the near future. The article concludes that, under current cir-
cumstances, soft law is the best legal regime for regulating greenhouse gases emissions from the aviation industry and black
carbon emissions from aerospace vehicles.2. Black carbon emissions from aerospace vehicles, climate change, and point-to-point ﬂights
According to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, black carbon can be either naturally produced or a result of
human activity (What is Black Carbon?, 2010), and is the main component of soot. The principal sources of human-induced
black carbon encompass “emissions from diesel engines, cook stoves, wood burning and forest ﬁres” (What is Black Carbon?,
2010). According to Boucher and Reddy, although black carbon is “short-lived” compared to carbon dioxide (Boucher &
Reddy, 2008, p. 198), its “destructive effect” on climate change is much greater than has been in the case of carbon dioxide
(Boucher & Reddy, 2008, p. 196). “A free chlorine in the exhaust” damages the ozone layer more, even if current rocket
emissions constitute just 1% of damage (Great expectations: An Assessment of the Potential for Suborbital Transportation,
2008, p. 73). This is mostly because particles of black carbon in the exhaust fumes of spacecraft do not return to Earth’s
surface, but stay approximately 40 km above the ground and create a dangerous soot layer. Michael Mills of the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) analysed the impact of that layer on climate change by using a computer model of
Earth (LiveScience Staff, 2010). The results indicate that Earth's surface temperature would decrease on average by 0.7 °C,
but the surface of Antarctica would rise by 0.8 °C (LiveScience Staff, 2010).
There is a need for the ICAO to regulate greenhouse gas and black carbon emissions. This is within the ICAO's area of
competence because an aerospace vehicle operates in the air zone rather than outer space for most of its ﬂight. Furthermore,
emissions from aerospace vehicles cannot be governed by space law, primarily because of Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967. Although Article IX imposed an obligation on states to prevent any harmful contamination from extra-
terrestrial matter, emissions from aerospace vehicles were not subject to this stipulation. It may be more effective to include
emissions from suborbital ﬂights in the annex to the Chicago Convention of 1944, or amend the current Annex 16 to that
convention with environmental-protection measures2. Air law is better established than less-developed space law. This is
why any ideas to create new, or amend current, space law legislation in the ﬁeld of black carbon emissions should be treated
in comparison as unrealistic and unlikely to be achieved in the current global situation. There is thus reluctance in agreeing
with Krois's (2011, p. 45). This is an ambitious proposal, but as mentioned earlier is unlikely to be successful in the near, or
even remote, future. Drafting a convention takes a couple of years on average. Bearing in mind the conﬂicting interests of
different states with regard to outer space, the possibility of a consensus is hardly visible.
Regrettably, most sources disregard the potential challenge posed by black carbon emissions in the discussion of sub-
orbital ﬂights. Instead, they focus on liability and responsibility issues on the part of space operators and governments, the
safety of participants in space ﬂights, and the technical safety of aerospace vehicles such as Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo
and Blue Origin's New Shepard. Without a doubt, these issues are crucial for the smooth running of an industry that will be
severely impacted in the event of any fatal accidents. According to estimates with regard to Virgin Galactic, 600 registered
“passengers” have already paid for a suborbital trip in the near future (Virgin Galactic'on track' for 2014 passenger ﬂights,
2013). Soon hundreds – and then thousands – of people will be taking suborbital ﬂights for pleasure (to "feel like an
astronaut") or, perhaps more importantly, to travel more quickly. Suborbital ﬂights reach much higher speeds than con-
ventional aeroplanes, even supersonic ones. Regular suborbital ﬂights will be widely available in the not-too-distant future
and there is therefore an urgent need to discuss this matter before it happens.
Opponents might say that results derived from computer simulations are neither an accurate nor reliable source of
information. This is true, because there is a need for up-to-date research performed in a real environment. This means that
climate-change researchers must cooperate both with space operators, such as Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin, and
environmental government agencies, such as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These agencies can play a
supervisory and monitoring role with respect to these experiments. The longer-term and more precise the research, the
more optimal the results that would be achieved. These results may help space operators to improve technological functions
in aerospace vehicles in a way that limits the level of emissions. This can be achieved by using better engine technologies
and more environmentally friendly fuels such as biobutanol (Doggett, 2009), a non-toxic “hybrid propulsion system that
uses nitrous oxide as an oxidizer and Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB)” (Knapp, 2013; DeLuca, et al., 2013).
However, non-toxic does not equal completely free of black carbon. At the moment, there are no statistics proving that
either the type of engine or eco-fuels can realistically decrease the amount of black carbon. What is currently known is that
a rocket launched into space 1000 times per year would contribute the same amount to climate change as total emissions
from all subsonic aircraft worldwide (Krois, 2011, p. 41).2 ICAO Annex 16 “International standards and recommended practices, Environmental protection”, Volume II “Aircraft engine emissions” (2008) at 16.
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and 80% of respondents are interested in going into space (Krois, 2011, p. 41). The research does not, however, reveal
whether these people can afford to be astronauts. Companies that offer suborbital ﬂights will therefore try to make them as
cost-effective as possible. In the event of expanding such travel to include point-to-point (P2P) ﬂights and then mass space
transportation, ﬂights could become cheaper the more people that ﬂy.
International point-to-point suborbital ﬂight (hereinafter P2P ﬂight) is “a special category of ﬂights above the
surface of the Earth (an altitude between 100 and 200 km), performed by the suborbital vehicle below the orbital
velocity where the place of departure (point one) and the place of destination (point two) are situated in at least two
jurisdictions” (Sikorska, 2014, p. 1056–1057). P2P ﬂights are the subject of international political and economic dis-
cussions. US law regulating suborbital ﬂights, which to date has been very business-oriented, has omitted what is the
prime role of the state regulator – namely to protect the weaker party in their capacity as a consumer. The suborbital-
ﬂight business, in the absence of international or European regulation, has been given a “green light” in the US as a
source for boosting the national economy and perhaps to strengthen the country’s position as a space power and leader
in space technology.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which will be involved in the regulation of point-to-point
suborbital ﬂights, has been affected by politics from the beginning of the space era in the US in 1961 because its budget
has been agreed upon by US Congress. Logsdon (1989, p. 3) claimed that the Apollo era, which has more to do with politics
than with science, because there are no conﬁrmed data about the income that can be made from space exploration and
the exploitation of the Moon or Mars (Logsdon, 1989, p. 4). As a solution, Handberg proposes that budget reform should
take place in the near future because it is too politically proﬁtable for members of Congress, as well as the President
(Handberg, 2003, p. 26). The author claims that reforms, which could work, would make NASA more like the ESA, which
has a “multi-year funding cycle” and receives automatic increases to ensure the predictability of space programmes
(Handberg, 2003, p. 26). It is also important to note that every space programme aims big, and the plans are often risky
and the outcomes hard to predict, which is the opposite of steady “routine politics” and politicians’ way of thinking
(Handberg, 2003, p. 30).
The challenge with every new market – and P2P ﬂights are no exception – is that, in accordance with Schumpchaper's
theory of economics, it is hard to predict how customers will react (Crouch et al., 2009, p. 441). Fulton Corporation estimated
in 2002 that there could be as many as 15,000 customers per annum for suborbital ﬂights (Crouch et al., 2009, p. 442), but it
must be borne in mind that P2P travel could involve yet more passengers because such ﬂights aim to act as a substitute for
the aviation industry rather than simply offering a fun adventure. Studies conducted in developed countries such as the UK,
Germany, Canada and the US have shown that 40–80% of respondents are interested in going into space (Crouch et al., 2009,
p. 442). However, such studies do not reveal whether these people can afford to buy their dream, or whether this is simply
an attitude that can be described as “I have a dream to go into space”. Companies that offer suborbital ﬂights will therefore
try to make the activity as cost-effective for the money charged as possible. In the case of mass space transportation, the
more people who ﬂy, the cheaper ﬂights could be. The international community will perhaps take a closer look at the
Japanese approach to achieving the best results for the most competitive price. Professor Suzuki indicates that cost-
effectiveness is prioritised in the Japanese space project at the International Space Station. In particular, he mentions key
characteristics of these cost-effective projects: ﬁrstly, they were created as a result of the private initiative of two small
companies; secondly, those companies have clear marketing targets (Suzuki, 2006, p. 433). It is therefore clear that despite
repeated statements that “exploration of space is mainly for scientiﬁc purposes”, this is not true.
Because point-to-point suborbital ﬂights are likely to become part of mass space transportation, Goehlich (2005, p. 293)
speciﬁes three steps that need to be taken for this to become a reality: ﬁrstly, he notes that there is a need to increase space
awareness among the general public; secondly, he suggests “developing and operating a suborbital vehicle for semi-regular
ﬂights”; and thirdly, “developing and operating an orbital vehicle for regular ﬂights”. He also refers to factors that are
indispensable in analysing the price for a ticket or price optimisation, namely “development and production costs, launch
rate, a fully operational ﬂeet, ﬂeet life-cycle costs and receipts, enterprise receipts and cost per launch, ticket price and
enterprise ticket cost, year of initial operational capability, cash ﬂow, and return on investment” (Goehlich, 2005, p. 296).
International point-to-point travel will become another incentive for space powers to compete, and legislation at any level
will be affected by long political deliberations together with economic estimations.3. International and EU greenhouse gas emissions from aeroplanes and climate change: to harmonise or to unify
International laws created by states and international organisations can be divided into binding (hard) and non-binding
(soft) laws. Forms of hard law such as treaties, conventions, international customs and general principles of international
law are included in Article 38, Chapter II, Statute of the International Court of Justice. Examples of soft law include
declarations, guidelines, statements, action plans, codes of practice and model laws, and this list is not exclusive. Binding law
describes the rights and obligations of states that have ratiﬁed, signed or acceded to a hard-law document. The provisions of
a binding instrument are rigid (Faria, 2009, p. 9), leading to disagreements between negotiating parties and long periods of
time spent drafting conventions. A good example is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), the process of “drafting and reﬁning the convention lasted 30 years” (Zeller, 2002). It can therefore be
P.E. Sikorska / International Comparative Jurisprudence 1 (2015) 133–142 137presumed that any hard law on emissions from the aerospace industry would take even longer than was the case with the
CISG, for which it was in the common interest of all parties to create a document that uniﬁed international sales. In the case
of emissions, it is more problematic because there are conﬂicting views about whether and how to regulate. States are
therefore often unwilling to be subjected to binding laws. An alternative is usually seen in soft laws, which leave space for
states to manoeuvre in implementing and obeying the provisions of such instruments; soft laws also do not impose
penalties for breaches of their provisions. The tension between the selection of different forms of law, in terms of con-
sidering whether one method might be more effective than another, is especially visible in international air and space law
that regulates emissions.
If the creation of international legal instruments is difﬁcult, the international coordination of existing national laws is
hardly easier. The international lawmaking process is under pressure from political and economic inﬂuences, which
automatically leads to the politicisation and economisation of law – of which greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation
industry can be seen as a vivid example. In the view of the author, politicisation results from a destructive use of politics in
the lawmaking process that weakens the efﬁciency of legal documents created by particular states. On the other hand,
economisation can be described as the use of economic tools and calculations to convince regulators and regulated
entities about the effectiveness and efﬁciency of new regulations. Rather than characterising these phenomena as two
negative trends, a distinction should be made between the destructive force of the politicisation of law and the useful tool
of economic calculation. An inability to create binding international law is common in the air and space arena, especially
in areas that governments care about most, such as security. Politics and economics can also have a massive inﬂuence on
international lawmaking processes to the extent that they can become ineffective. Furthermore, there are social differ-
ences between developed and developing countries with regard to the most effective and equitable approach to the
regulation of emissions. The former group of nations attempts to create a single uniform framework, whereas the latter
group opposes this by contending that they did not contribute to the status quo of emissions and asserting that they have
the right to the same opportunity for economic growth as developed countries had. Developing nations therefore insist
that they should not be obliged to pay for the consequences of climate change by adhering to regulations that require
reductions in emissions. This is why it has been so hard to either harmonise or unify international emissions from the
aviation industry, and it will be difﬁcult to do the same with black carbon emissions from aerospace vehicles at a
global level.
Harmonization is a process of establishing a level of equilibrium between laws of different legal systems in order to avoid
conﬂicts of law. This can be achieved by changing rules, standards or processes. “Harmonization does not lead to the one set
of agreed rules and it can be achieved by international agreement between states or by mandate of a regional supranational
institution” (Zaphiriou, 1993, p. 407). Harmonization also embraces “a wide spectrum of ways to combat differences in legal
concepts in different jurisdictions.” (Gopalan, 2004, p. 275). An example of harmonization in the ﬁeld of emissions within
the aviation industry is the EU Directive, which harmonized the laws of member states that regulate emissions from this
speciﬁc industry by requiring that they all meet a basic standard. Harmonization is often confused with uniﬁcation which
means the “adoption of an agreed set of rules, standards or guidelines” (Zaphiriou, 1993, p. 407) in one legal document. In
the case of emissions, uniﬁcation of law would be an international treaty agreed upon by the states or the international legal
framework created by the organization having a mandate to regulate international civil aviation, namely the ICAO. In effect,
the creation of the ICAO uniﬁed all the matters related to international civil aviation in one agency, however it has not yet
uniﬁed the law on emissions by facilitating the creation of one internationally binding body of law on the subject. On the
other hand, the ICAO is capable of creating laws which aim to achieve harmonization in the international civil aviation.
However, it is currently impossible for the ICAO to regulate emissions from aerospace vehicles because it has no legal
mandate to do so. Accordingly, the ICAO cannot at present create any hard or soft law regulations aiming to harmonize this
sector. In addition, there is no other international organization which is capable of regulating the sector of aerospace
vehicles. To date, this sector is devoid of international binding regulations to limit the emission of greenhouse gases and
black carbon, despite the fact that both of these forms of pollution have the most deteriorating impact on climate change.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for increasing the efﬁciency of the laws regulating emissions of greenhouse gasses and
black carbon in international air and space law.
Rosett (1992, p. 683) claims that a signiﬁcant advantage of harmonisation is achieving “general consistence in law”.
However, this is doubtful because several sets of different rules can bring about more confusion than solutions. On the other
hand, uniﬁcation in the area of international legal instruments would set out a number of rules that were uniform for each
contracting party, without distinction between developed and less-developed countries. Such an instrument would
undoubtedly be the most effective type of measure, but has no realistic chance of being created – in large part because of the
claims of less-developed countries that developed countries hold prime responsibility for climate change. This is, however,
doubtful, because several sets of different rules can bring more confusion that solutions. In the context of aviation emissions,
developed countries can use environmentally friendly engines and better fuels. The airlines of less-developed countries, on
the other hand, use less advanced technology, failed to meet the conditions for minimal emissions set out by the EU, and as a
result are banned from the region's air zone (Commission implementing regulation (EU), 2014). The less-developed
countries are now in the process of their own industrialisation, and this acts as a serious obstacle to the creation of a binding
– or even non-binding – single uniﬁed set of international rules for emissions from aerospace vehicles. If such a uniform
document could be created, the developed countries would be doubly rewarded because they have already beneﬁted from
economic and technological growth, and would now beneﬁt from low emissions. For less-developed states, on the other
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economic growth.
Differences in opinion on standardisation of emissions between developed and less-developed countries undermine the
potential effectiveness of a uniform binding law between countries. The international community decides on one standard
for emissions, or considers using a soft-law instrument because of an inability to create hard law. This is the never-ending
challenge of international law: taking into consideration the interests of both developed and developing countries in
establishing a single emissions standard. Professor Ancel (1976, p. 115) wrote that in the process of the harmonisation of law,
developed and developing states ought to be treated differently. In light of this statement, uniﬁcation between states would
be impossible and harmonisation through having a different set of rules applicable to emissions from aerospace vehicles
would not bring the intended consistency.
Another argument, by Stephan (1998, p. 746), is that the harmonisation of international commercial law would decrease
legal risk, making transactions more certain and predictable. If an international convention is established, all business
parties will be aware of its provisions. The outcome of a single law would therefore be greater reliability and predictability
than would be the case with numerous national laws. In particular, some African states rely heavily on customary law, and
their systems are constructed in the fashion of legal pluralism. International insolvency law can be used as an analogy for
international air and space law regulating emissions. If a multilateral treaty has been chosen as an instrument to harmonise
or unify emissions, it must be remembered that such a document is created through a lengthy formal process that comprises
several consultations and diplomatic meetings. If countries therefore consciously decide to include emissions in a treaty, this
implies ﬁrstly that a sufﬁcient number of nations must be party to that treaty for it to enter in force; secondly, upon
ratiﬁcation, accession or signature, a party would be accorded certain rights and obligations; and ﬁnally, breaching any of
the rights or obligations would amount to a breach of international law. In other words, states cannot be forced to be a party
to a treaty, although they can be put under political or economic pressure to do so. If a hypothetical multilateral treaty called
the International Convention Regulating Emissions from the Aerospace Industry was proposed, the possible outcomes might
be as follows:
the most interested states might not be willing to become parties, and would thus be excluded from the “rights and
obligations” of the convention;
the most interested states might become parties but have reservations, excluding the application of certain provisions of
the convention and thus undermining its whole purpose;
the most unrealistic scenario is that all interested parties would unreservedly sign the convention, thus achieving full
harmonisation.
Professor Mohan (2012, p. 200) describes cross-border insolvency proceedings as “inefﬁcient, prolonged and costly”. In
the case of emissions, stagnation caused by a lack of effective international regulations and over-reliance on voluntary
instruments (VETS Report, 2007) created by the International Civil Aviation Organization have made regulation inefﬁcient.
Even minimal compliance falters if not every ICAO member state even supplies annual reports on emissions. Attempted
harmonisation through a soft-law document created by the ICAO would thus fail in its purpose. The process is also pro-
longed because procedures for oversight by the ICAO are lengthy and costly because of the need for legal and technical
veriﬁcation. Professor Burman indicates that different rules for insolvency proceedings operate in different countries
(Burman, 1995, p. 2543), and furthermore, different technical standards are applied to measure emissions in each nation.
The provisions of the Chicago Convention do not oblige contracting states to achieve minimum standards of emissions.
Article 33 of the Convention only speciﬁes minimum standards relating to “certiﬁcates of airworthiness, certiﬁcates of
competency and licenses”. It is therefore apparent that safety and security take priority over emissions concerns. This is
justiﬁable, but the subject of emissions should not be totally neglected as they currently are. The model example for a
convention, subject to an adequate number of signatures, ratiﬁcations or accessions, would bring not only a clear set of
internationally recognised rules and impose global measures and limits on emissions, but would also expand international
cooperation among lawyers (Stephan, 1998, p. 750).
From another perspective, Professor Zamora explains that harmonisation is not inherently linked with one uniform
document, but instead attempts to reconcile different legal rules (Zamora, 1995, p. 403). This can be achieved through
so-called model laws created by non-state organisations. Some of these laws have proven very successful, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency (1997). The advantage of a model law is that it can be implemented either as a whole or as particular provisions in the
domestic legal systems of interested states (Studies in trade and investment, 2004, p. 20). The hypothetical Model Law on
Global Emissions from the Aerospace Industry created by the ICAO can add some ﬂexibility because it does not have to be
rigid. Furthermore, there is less political pressure when model laws are used and the lawmakers are more independent,
because scholars from many jurisdictions take an active role in the drafting process – although this can also be seen as a
disadvantage because of a lack of representative capacity and the fact that lobby and interest groups can inﬂuence the
wording of a model law (Goehlich, 2005, p. 293). In addition, the neutrality of provisions in such laws minimises potential
objections (Gopalan, 2004, p. 289). Despite all these efforts, the outcome could be that the model law is ultimately another
soft law created by the ICAO that adds no value to the effective regulation of emissions.
Aviation is judged by many scholars to be “the biggest contributor to climate change” after road transport (Chapman,
2007, p. 356). Gossling and Upham have warned that the contribution of 3 per cent from aviation to climate change will not
last long, because the aviation sector is still expanding (Gossling & Upham, 2009, p. 4). One of the main challenges in
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and eco-aware countries but very liberal in developing ones. As a result, attempts to regulate emissions at an international
level can bring more problems than solutions (Hoof, 1983, p. 189; Fahey & Curtin, 2014, p. 14). Rothengatter points out that
the ICAO, which is in sole charge of imposing taxation and charges in international civil aviation by virtue of the Chicago
Convention, is unable to do so because of conﬂicting interests among member states (Rothengatter, 2010, p. 11). Any
convention that seeks to impose such charges, and practically every convention that aims to regulate emissions at an
international level, therefore has to include them, and must cooperate closely with the ICAO. It is an open secret that the
ICAO becomes a forum for political, and not legal, discussion.
In addition to strictly legal obstacles to the regulation of emissions, growing social awareness on the impact of the
aviation industry on climate change is still too small to persuade legislators to start requiring mitigation actions. Cohen and
Higham found in their research that “participants were unlikely to forgo potential travel decisions to New Zealand because
of concern over air travel emissions” (Cohen & Higham, 2011, p. 329).
There are several models of soft and hard international and EU laws that aim to reduce air pollution, but none of them
regulate emissions from the international civil aviation industry. The ﬁrst soft-law document that began the debate on the
condition of the environment in the context of air pollution was the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. The Geneva Convention
of 1979 was the ﬁrst internationally binding law to include the need for limitation and reduction of transboundary air
pollution by contracting parties. Despite the goodwill of drafters, the wording of the articles is too vague and imprecise, such
as “shall endeavour to limit” and “as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent” (Article 2, Geneva Convention, 1979). In
addition, the ICAO decided in 1980 to create a binding Annex No. 16 to the Chicago Convention that addressed environ-
mental issues relating to the aviation industry. While widespread recognition of the impact of aviation on climate change
occurred later in the 1990s, close research on the issue was conducted in 1996 and the ﬁrst preventive measures were
introduced in 1998 (Oberthür, 2003, p. 196). Another proposition made by the ICAO was the establishment of a Group on
International Aviation and Climate Change in 2007. Despite these efforts, neither the ICAO nor binding international laws
created to date have effectively regulated emissions from the aviation industry. The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 achieved a lot by differentiating between developed and developing countries. The
supplement to the Convention was the Kyoto Protocol, which urged countries included in Annex I to “pursue limitation or
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation… working through the
International Civil Aviation Organization” (Article 2(2)) by introducing concrete reduction levels. Professor Dempsey claims
that the Protocol does not refer to international aviation because, ﬁrstly, it would be difﬁcult to "attribute international
emissions to a single state" (Dempsey, p. 450) and, secondly, such a hypothetical attribution would be "ultra vires as the only
competent organization in the ﬁeld of international aviation is [the ICAO]" (Dempsey, p. 450).
The situation changed rapidly after the EU Directive came into force in 2012. This was the ﬁrst binding document to
speciﬁcally regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the civil aviation industry. It covered all commercial aeroplanes that
carried passengers and cargo and departed from or landed at an EU airport (Budd et al., 2013, p. 118). The rationale of the EU
was to encompass all states with airlines that ﬂew in the European air zone and thus more effectively tackle transboundary
air pollution.
The most legally questionable article in the EU Directive dealt with the inclusion of a cap-and-trade scheme for non-EU
countries (third states), thus raising the important issue of jurisdiction and state sovereignty in international law. Professor
Brownlie stated that “the sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations,
which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal personality” (Brownlie, 2008, p. 289). As a
result of these principles, a sovereign state can have exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and a duty of non-intervention in
areas of exclusive jurisdiction of other states. This principle became an apple of discord between the European Commission,
enforcing the EU Directive, and some non-European states with their national airlines. They claimed that the EU usurped the
right to act as the ICAO and de facto placed EU law on the same footing as international law, even though EU law is binding
only on member states of the European Union. They argued therefore that from a legal point of view, third states ought to be
excluded from the provisions of the Directive. As a response, in 2011 several US airlines brought cases (Case C-366/10)
before the European Court of Justice, the only court that can assess the EU jurisprudence, questioning the EU Directive on
several grounds. The Court's opinion involved an ongoing discussion about the relationship between EU and international
law. The ruling held that the Directive was a valid piece of law that was complementary to international law. In response, the
US House of Representatives called the EU Directive “ill-based and illegal” (CAPA, 2011), and passed a bill forcing US airlines
not to obey it. China, India and Russia also openly contested the Directive and at a meeting in Moscow in February 2012,
agreed on an action plan against it. The action plan would include “barring airlines from participating in the Brussels plan;
ﬁling a formal complaint at the UN's civil aviation body – the ICAO; imposing levies or charges on EU airlines as a coun-
termeasure; and stopping talks with EU carriers on new routes” (ICTSD, 2012). The pressure imposed by the EU Directive on
the international community resulted in the decision by the ICAO at the 38th Assembly meeting in October 2013 to adopt
more concrete measures aimed at regulating greenhouse gas emissions in a binding legal form. The Assembly agreed to
begin working on global market-based measures for aviation emissions at the next session in 2016, and to create an
international framework on the basis of those measures by 2020. However, it can be predicted that the international fra-
mework will not be created by 2020, despite good intentions. Firstly, the ICAO has not created any binding document
concerning global emissions from the aviation sector. And secondly, ICAO member states have not been able to reach a
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framework. The next initiative of the ICAO therefore seems doubtful from the perspective of aerospace vehicles.4. Conclusion
Bearing in mind the reluctance to regulate greenhouse gases in any binding manner at an international level, a con-
clusion can be reached that there is no feasible solution to the problem. To date, there is no internationally binding law that
regulates greenhouse gases emissions from the aviation industry or black carbon emissions from the emerging sector of
aerospace vehicles, despite growing evidence of the adverse impact of such emissions on climate change. The politicisation
and economisation of law, which prevent hard-law regulations, are likely to put political interests and preferences before
law. In a similar way, economic calculations with regard to emissions limits are likely to impede the lawmaking process. The
idea of amending or creating any current space-law legislation in the ﬁeld of black carbon emissions should be treated as
unrealistic and impossible to achieve in the current global situation. The creation of a hard law does not guarantee that a
state will become a party to it. Even if a comprehensive convention is created (for example, under the auspices of the United
Nations Ofﬁce for Outer Space Affairs), it might never be ratiﬁed by a sufﬁcient number of states to come into force. As a
result, it might turn the best intentions into failure, as in the case of the Moon Treaty (1979).
If, therefore, the creation of any international binding laws seems nearly impossible, soft laws could be considered as
options. Paradoxically, the lack of sanctions for breaching soft laws increases their effectiveness because it increases the
likelihood of them being accepted in the ﬁrst place. States have proved over the last 50 years that they have had little
interest in environmental matters that were lingering at the bottom of the hierarchy of important issues and always fell
behind international politics and economy, but soft law is not as "harmful" because of its apparent lack of sanctions. Once a
soft law is created, the informal pressure of public opinion emerges to help enforce it. All corporations that operate in the
aerospace sector – from established companies such as Boeing and Airbus to newer ones such as Virgin Galactic and Blue
Origin – can prove that they care about the environment and, as a result, create self-imposed limitations. This positive public
opinion could increase the companies’ proﬁts, thus placing proﬁt maximisation on the same side as the good of the
environment. Only in the future, when emissions reach a critical point and may be unpleasant to humans, will both the ICAO
and state governments meet to create an international framework regulating emissions from the aerospace industry.
The next issue is whether to harmonise or unify emissions from the aviation industry. It appears that harmonisation
cannot be achieved at an international level because, up to this point, only one relevant soft law document has been created
by the ICAO. The harmonisation of emissions standards in the aerospace sector also cannot be achieved because there is no
international law regulating emissions. Uniﬁcation in the form of one binding document is not possible because of the
politicisation and economisation of law, and soft-law instruments are unlikely to succeed in the process of uniﬁcation
because of their non-binding nature. Soft law will never be a replacement for binding law – it is simply a bridge to restore
international cooperation and draw the attention of the international community to the seriousness of the problem of
greenhouse gases and black carbon emissions, initiating some action to help alleviate problems while a longer-term solution
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